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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS' ROLE WITHIN NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
Military history reveals certain technological advancements that have forever altered the conduct of warfare. Some examples include: machine guns and enhanced field artillery in WWI; vast improvements in airplanes and tanks during WWII; and air mobility via the helicopter in the Vietnam War. Currently, the U.S. has been at war for six years: What is the icon of today's battlefield? Perhaps Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) should join this list. While this paper does not seek to support or refute this proposition, it does argue that the proliferation of UAS has significantly affected combat operations. Current operational theaters serve as proving grounds for both programmed and experimental UAS; many have successfully supported commanders' situational awareness requirements. Wartime commanders are increasing their requests for UAS.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) subsequent actions to fulfill these requirements attest to their growing relevance. Like many of the technical capabilities fielded as part of DOD transformation, UAS requires communications networking resources to operate and to realize their maximum potential. However, fully integrating UAS within these operational theaters continues to challenge military leaders. DOD cannot fully implement its vision of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) without fully integrating UAS within the theater communications network. This paper examines UAS' role in NCW. First, it provides a brief background on NCW and UAS to establish their distinct relevance. Then it explores three key considerations necessary to fully integrate these two elements: UAS' role in facilitating information dissemination, UAS' role as an aerial communications relay, and UAS' ability to operate within a constrained frequency spectrum environment. To answer that question the author first provides basic NCW tenets:
• A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared awareness.
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 3 Not focused exclusively on technology, NCW seeks to empower military commanders by providing them with enhanced situational awareness and information superiority. The
Services currently rely on their individual funding to field networked communications and electronic systems to achieve this operational advantage and to meet warfighters' It's got to go to the core of operations. The information from (UASs) could, and I contend, should populate the global information grid 16 , to the maximum extent possible. Systems of systems can provide the appropriate information at the right time to those who need it. This would correspond to improve situational awareness at all levels of warfare. … It's about decision superiority.
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Creating an "information stovepipe" where the UAS data is transmitted to a single location provides value only to a limited audience. The situational awareness information that UAS provides greatly add to the "common operational picture" of the battlefield. But should everyone have access to this information? Should all UAS information populate the theater information grid? Answering these questions serves two purposes central to a discussion on information dissemination. First, it forces a disciplined approach to addressing information exchange requirements (who needs the information and therefore, where does the information need to go). Second, it highlights interoperability requirements between the UAS components and the theater communications architecture (how effectively the information gets to their destinations).
Each Service seeks to codify information demand and exchange requirements, in part, to properly train and equip their organizations. While this is an imperfect science, requirements do vary at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This paper offers two brief data points to shape this discussion. First, DOD has stated that it is technologically impracticable to provide full access to the products derived from tactical, hand-held UAS. 18 Accordingly, this analysis will focus on operational and strategic level UAS unless otherwise noted. Secondly, leaders should beware of the "transfixing" effect that UAS video can have on personnel within the command and control facilities. Realtime ISR video feeds can unnecessarily become the center of attention of those not directly involved in that mission. In fact, a recently published multi-service UAS manual warns that "access to real-time UAS video requires discipline and dedication to viewing the imagery only when necessary and by those who have a need." 19 While the Services may not fully capture all information requirements, operational and strategic UAS must enable common access to the information they provide to function as a relevant asset within NCW. Such access requires interoperability with the network transport and data systems within the communications architecture of the theater. However, the GAO has continually cited a lack of interoperability among the various UAS components and current communications systems, designating this shortcoming as a major impediment to joint operations. 20 To meet military demands, DOD rapidly designed, enhanced, and fielded UAS. Traditional acquisition processes that govern DOD programs of record do not always allow the rapid infusion of the technological advancements sought by deployed military units. 21 Unfortunately, time saved in quickly fielding Service-specific UAS has also affected their ability to operate jointly. Each Service, as well as U.S. Special Operations Command, is developing UAS to support all military echelons from the small unit level to the Joint Force Commander.
"In fact, by 2010, DOD plans on having at least 14 different UAS in the force structure to support a variety of missions." 22 Additional experimental UAS variants will add to this number and could easily contribute to the interoperability issue. Lack of interoperability creates significant engineering challenges for theater network planners -at times resulting in less than ideal architectural solutions. In worse cases, lack of interoperability breaks the information flow and prevents information-sharing altogether.
To establish uniform standards and provide executive-level oversight, DOD established the UAS Task Force with a mission to "lead a Department-wide effort to coordinate critical UAS issues, and to develop a way ahead for UAS that will enhance operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline acquisition." 23 The One System will be …TCDL compliant, which will provide us a more reliable datalink and more efficient use of the frequency spectrum. The One System will also be NATO Standardization Agreement 4586 compliant which will provide us interoperability across joint and coalition unmanned systems. The One System concept has already peaked interest with our NATO partners. They understand the power of having a single set of ground equipment that can interoperate with an entire fleet of joint and coalition unmanned aircraft. 26 DOD recognizes the value of employing TCDL across all Services and maintains that goal as one of its primary objectives required to achieve interoperability. 27 To further improve information dissemination, the U.S. Army is also fielding the One System Remote Video (OSRVT) terminal to its deployed forces. OSRVT is a lightweight (portable or platform-mounted) system capable of receiving broadcast images from several UAS simultaneously. 28 While these are steps in the right direction, it addresses only a portion of the problem. Many UAS still pass their critical video, sensor, and control information to a single Ground Control Station in a closed circuit fashion, thereby isolating the UAS from the theater network and thus from other battlefield elements. 29 Users then must often rely on a completely separate networking solution to receive UAS products.
One example of a separate network is the Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
program, which offers a high-speed, one-way flow of information (video and data) to deployed and garrisoned users. Additional theater communications resources must transmit the UAS video from the local source to a GBS theater or primary injection point, perhaps located outside of the country of origin, which in turn re-transmits the video via satellite to users' GBS receive suites located back in the theater. 30 Such videos have certainly traveled a long way to get disseminated throughout the theater battlefield. This example is not intended to denigrate the GBS program. In fact, this program currently provides an invaluable product to the warfighter. The existing theater network simply cannot disseminate the large amount of UAS video required throughout the region.
However, NCW requires consolidation of networking solutions to enable rapid information exchange, to enable users to query relevant information sources, and to promote positional awareness of key battlefield elements. 31 For UAS to be a viable part of the NCW environment, they must be able to directly "plug" into the theater network.
Common GCS using TCDL is a start, but DOD must provide a communications network Inherent within the WIN-T concept is the full network integration of UAS to maximize network capacity and efficiency and to improve information dissemination. Given the almost insatiable appetite for the network, theater planners continue to increase the use of UAS as aerial relay nodes. In fact, of the sixteen different mission areas associated with theater UAS, Combatant Commands ranked "communications/data relay" as fourth. 33 The following section argues that UAS serve a growing and significant role in enabling NCW through their ability to extend the network.
This analysis focuses on DOD's programmed and experimental approach to building the aerial communications layer and addresses associated opportunities and challenges.
What is meant by an 'aerial communications layer' and why is it required?
Answering these fundamental questions requires a look at the conduct of current military operations and requires a brief scan of future joint operational concepts. Today, U.S. forces are spread out over great distances, operating in urban or mountainous terrain, and often arrayed in a non-contiguous fashion. To support these units, the network requires an architecture consisting of three layers (or tiers Strategy cites the ability to conduct network-centric operations as one of DOD's "key operational capabilities" required to ensure effectiveness of a highly distributed force. 35 In describing required future capabilities, The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations declares that "the joint force will capitalize on being networked…and will exploit network connectivity among dispersed joint force elements to improve information sharing, collaboration, coordinated maneuver, and integrated situational awareness." 36 The The essential question is whither the network can meet these future expectations.
The answer is quite significant. No network equates to no Network Centric Warfare.
Given the looming impediments to DOD transformation and future joint operations, leveraging UAS to increase network robustness and to provide access to otherwise disadvantaged users is an option worthy of serious consideration. In fact, a DODsponsored study has concluded that total satellite demands will exceed requirements without the establishment of an aerial communications network. 38 The U.S. Army Signal Center has confirmed this conclusion by asserting that future network capacity will meet only half of military requirements; the Signal Center therefore strongly advocates development of an aerial communications layer to redress this shortfall. 39 Fortunately, DOD has several programmed and experimental efforts underway to develop such capability.
The Services are on a path to build an aerial layer communications capability using either manned or unmanned platforms. The Air Force's Objective Gateway, an acquisition program-of-record, is designed to field an airborne network relay and communications gateway to link up various air and ground elements. As a key part of this program, the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) provides an airborne communications relay package and data information server. Although the Air
Force is currently testing BACN within a manned aircraft, program technicians anticipate integrating this system within a UAS. 40 The Marine Corps has provided their Marine Airborne Re-Transmission System (MARTS) in response to urgent requirements from their deployed units. This experimental program, developed by the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency, fields a tethered, unmanned airship that relays radio communications within an area in excess of 68 nautical miles. 41 The Navy is also pursuing similar aerial communications relay capabilities to support their fleet. To meet current demands and future requirements, the Army is making a considerable effort to provide a UAS tactical aerial communications relay.
Although ISR remains a primary mission, the Army's Shadow UAS also provides radio communications relay to brigade-sized elements. 42 UAS. 44 Among its mission capabilities, the Class IV UAS, currently designated the Fire Scout, provides aerial communications relay coverage. According to the Army's concept, to achieve their maximum capability the FCS BCT ...leverages all available resources to provide a robust, survivable, scalable and reliable heterogeneous communications network that seamlessly integrates ground, near ground, airborne and space-borne assets for constant connectivity and layered redundancy. 45 The Army's WIN-T program and the DOD's JTRS program will provide this network transport layer to connect both FCS Brigades and today's modular forces. To address future network demands, both programs also provide aerial communications relay packages for UAS. In several ways, DOD has just begun to develop aerial communications relay capabilities. The Services continue to pursue this capability for a simple but telling reason: They require more network access than they currently possess. Using UAS for this mission presents both opportunities and challenges for DOD and indeed for advocates of NCW.
The potential benefits include addition of another means to extend the network to those who would otherwise remain isolated. Aerial communications relays could serve as an alternative to terrestrial systems that functionally rely on both line-of-sight and protected territory to function -both being problematic in counterinsurgency operations in urban and complex terrain. It also provides an alternative to costly and limited satellite resources -which do not respond quickly to short-notice demands.
With these potential benefits, however, come significant challenges. Separate
Service-led pursuits increase the risk of exacerbating the problems first realized in integrating UAS within the joint operational environment to execute ISR missions.
Without established program standards and technical protocols for developing an aerial layer tier, DOD may not provide a capability that interoperates with existing and future data and transport architectures. To efficiently integrate an aerial tier within the theater network, units need appropriate concepts and doctrine that provide network management and planning guidance. UAS aerial communications relay missions must expand the network in a predictive and responsive manner which may conflict with other UAS mission requirements (i.e. ISR) deemed at a higher priority by unit commanders.
Lastly, in order for UAS to further enable NCW as an aerial communications relay, DOD must address a problem that continues to plague the operational success of current UAS ISR missions and indeed many other systems -lack of available operating spectrum.
Spectrum Availability -Making the Magic Work
While not all military leaders understand, nor care to understand, the technology that enables the vast amount of electronic systems found in today's military environment, there is one cold hard fact that most experienced leaders now understand:
They need bandwidth to make the "magic" work. Perhaps more precisely: The availability of adequate frequencies within the electromagnetic frequency spectrum enables many of these systems to operate. However, the lack of spectrum availability continues to impede current military operations. UAS are chief amongst these spectrum claimants; according to a 2007 GAO report, UAS suffer from operational problems due to increased competition for available spectrum and their inability to operate within this constrained environment. 46 UAS must acquire the ability to operate in a spectrumconstrained environment to perform their various missions and to function fully as a NCW asset. The following section first provides brief insights on how DOD arrived at this dilemma and examines its associated operational implications. The analysis then focuses on several initiatives aimed at addressing spectrum problems within DODspecifically, those efforts concentrating on better integrating UAS into the NCW arena.
In keeping with transformation objectives, DOD has equipped its forces with significant technological capabilities. Units now possess dramatically improved command and intelligence systems, wireless and satellite communications, and other technical systems designed to protect their forces and enhance operational performance. These military units have brought these new capabilities, as well as commercially procured systems deemed critical, to Iraq and Afghanistan and turned them all on. This surge resulted in a massive grab for available frequencies -all competing not only with U.S. and Coalition military systems but also with civilian, host nation, and other governmental agencies. 47 In some cases, military systems did not operate or were degraded due to frequency interference. Despite extensive coordination by U.S. Central Command to ensure proper pre-deployment apportionment of frequencies, the scale and complexity of operations in Iraq has dashed any hope of resolving all spectrum conflicts. John Grimes, the DOD Chief Information Officer and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, has admitted that DOD did not fully anticipate the demand for spectrum in the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. 48 As significant as this demand was in the early stages of the war, the need continues to soar with the introduction of additional UAS, wireless radio systems, weapons, and sensors used by U.S. and coalition forces.
To compound the problem, the U.S. is now engaging in a form of electronic warfare in an effort to defend against insurgency tactics that employ radio controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs). To counter the threat of IEDs, the U.S has quickly fielded an array of electronic jamming devices that, while successfully disrupting the signals enabling the IEDs, have also the unintended consequence of jamming U.S. and Coalition systems to include radio links controlling UAS. 49 UAS continue to fill a significant need; they are in greater demand as they demonstrate battlefield successes. However, without the flexibility to operate in a dynamic, spectrum-constrained environment, they impose severe planning limitations on their users. Simply stated, UAS cannot operate nor "plug" into the network without spectrum resources -which makes their potential contributions to NCW questionable.
How did DOD get into this predicament? To address this question, this section asserts two contributing factors. First, operational necessity to quickly field UAS led to design solutions that did not take into consideration spectrum limitations. Second, the DOD failed to enforce spectrum supportability as a criterion during the traditional acquisition processes. This paper does not thoroughly review DOD acquisition policies and procedures.
However, it has found that these regulations include "spectrum supportability" criteria to ensure that the designed equipment can function in the environment for which it was acquired. But, a report released by the Defense Spectrum Office asserts that "Current methods for assuring that systems have spectrum access are poorly defined, too slow, subjective and inconsistent." This report goes on to claim that, in fact, the acquisition community frequently avoids spectrum supportability requirements.
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In the final analysis, UAS and other critical military systems are encountering operational problems due to inadequate spectrum resources because of problems within military acquisition processes.
As spectrum availability problems still persist, both DOD and the UAS development community have recognized the scope and severity of the problem. Vice Admiral Nancy Brown, the Joint Staff J6, asserts that adjustments to DOD acquisition processes now require earlier spectrum supportability assessments. Adm. Brown goes on to claim that improved spectrum management tools and training within the Services will improve current integration problems and help prevent further spectrum-related conflicts. 53 The UAS development community is also taking steps to ensure their products can operate within spectrum constraints. UAS using Tactical Control Data Link (TCDL) enhances interoperability and therefore improves informational dissemination.
TCDL also promotes efficient use of the frequency spectrum by providing UAS the flexibility to operate in a wider range of frequencies. 54 In keeping with DOD transformation objectives and indeed current wartime operational requirements, the Services developed and fielded UAS and other capabilities that use advanced communication, sensor, and networking technologies. In essence, the DOD has entered the early stages of executing NCW -and within this construct has revealed some significant challenges. Access to frequency spectrum is a fundamental requirement for many of these systems; a requirement taken for granted by some product developers. So this issue continues to cause operational problems for theater commanders. DOD's continued emphasis on network-centric operations makes reliable spectrum access even more critical. 55 (2) DOD must systematically support the development of an aerial communications layer to broaden network availability and increase network efficiencies.
The demand for network capacity continues to soar. Each service is pursuing an aerial communications relay capability to partially address these demands. However, DOD must ensure a coordinated approach to developing this capability by establishing and enforcing networking standards and protocols. DOD must provide concepts for network management and network planning. Lastly, DOD should formally pursue a High Altitude Long Loiter (HALL) capability as part of the aerial layer tier. While experimental HALL variants exist, DOD does not have a formal HALL program-of-record. These platforms can provide communications coverage for hundreds of kilometers; and, unlike other lower level UAS, they do not suffer from line-of-sight, airspace, spectrum, and weather limitations.
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(3) DOD must ensure that UAS can operate in an environment with limited availability of frequency spectrum. UAS roles and missions will only increase as necessity demands and more innovation takes place. They will operate not only in isolated battlefields, but also in highly populated urban areas and ad hoc military operating bases. As for many network-centric systems, DOD must strictly enforce spectrum supportability benchmarks early in the acquisition process. UAS testing should occur in a spectrum-constrained environment often in the design phases; UAS should have the ability to reprogram to a wide range of frequencies as required. To increase the ability to de-conflict UAS and resolve other spectrum interference issues, DOD must develop management tools that provide real-time awareness of spectrum use and that populate a database that graphically visualizes frequency use within a given environment. 57 Conclusion DOD, and indeed other U.S. and international government and civilian agencies, has only just begun to capitalize on unmanned aircraft systems. Successes in this domain also inspire the design of unmanned systems that operate on land and on or under water. The potential of these systems to serve is almost unlimited. However, putting these capabilities into operation requires a thorough understanding of the communications environment in which they must function. These systems, like so many other capabilities designed under the imperative of promoting network-centric warfare operations, generate requirements on the theater communications network. To make DOD's vision of NCW a reality, UAS and the "network" must co-operate. Achieving this goal requires fulfilling three mandates: UAS must perform interoperability with both the theater network and other adjoining systems to promote information dissemination efficiencies; DOD must support developing UAS's role as an aerial communications relay node to broaden network connectivity within the theater; and DOD must ensure that UAS can function within an environment that contains limited frequency spectrum availability. The Services can certainly field net-centric "pieces and parts" that alone offer tremendous potential. However, interconnecting these systems to build a unified, networked capability that satisfies warfighters' demands remains the ultimate challenge. 
